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Abstract
(A point-by-point response to a comment (quant-ph/0509130) on our paper (quant-ph/0509089)
is added as Appendix C. We find the comment incorrect.)
Einstein’s criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is an important
part of his legacy. Although most physicists consider Einstein’s criticism technically unfounded,
we show that the Copenhagen interpretation is actually incorrect, since Born’s probability expla-
nation of the wave function is incorrect due to a false assumption on “continuous probabilities” in
modern probability theory. “Continuous probability” means a “probability measure” that can take
every value in a subinterval of the unit interval (0, 1). We prove that such “continuous probabili-
ties” are invalid. Since Bell’s inequality also assumes “continuous probabilities”, the result of the
experimental test of Bell’s inequality is not evidence supporting the Copenhagen interpretation.
Although successful applications of quantum mechanics and explanation of quantum phenomena
do not necessarily rely on the Copenhagen interpretation, the question asked by Einstein 70 years
ago, i.e., whether a complete description of reality exists, still remains open.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Albert Einstein made many fundamental contributions to the development of
quantum mechanics, he remained critical to the Copenhagen interpretation of this theory
[1]. Niels Bohr was the main defender against Einstein’s criticism. Their celebrated debate
lasted for more than a decade. Most physicists, however, consider this part of the story
of Einstein’s life somehow ironic. By simply taking the quantum mechanical description as
reality itself, most physicists nowadays have put the issue raised by Einstein, i.e., whether
the quantum mechanical description of physical reality is complete [2], behind them. This is
largely due to the result of the experimental test of Bell’s inequality [3]. However, in contrast
to commonly accepted belief, we shall show that the quantum mechanical description (based
on the Copenhagen interpretation) is actually incorrect.
Unlike Einstein’s criticism, which might be due to his insistence on causality [1], the basis
of our claim above is of a technical nature. We prove that Born’s probability explanation of
the wave function is incorrect (Section II), and show that the experimental result of Bell’s
inequality is not evidence supporting the Copenhagen interpretation (Section III).
Besides the proof in Section II, Appendix A contains two more involved versions of the
proof. Appendix B discusses the hypothetical nature of “continuous probability”, which
is an incorrect assumption adopted in modern probability theory and causes the falsity of
Born’s probability explanation.
II. FALSITY OF BORN’S PROBABILITY EXPLANATION
The wave function, denoted by ψ, is the solution of Schro¨dinger’s equation governing
a particle. According to Born’s explanation, the normalized |ψ|2 is a “probability density
function”, which implies a “continuous probability”, i.e., a “probability measure” whose
range includes an interval. However, assuming “continuous probabilities” is a fundamental
flaw in modern probability theory. Actually, the range of any probability measure cannot
include intervals, so “continuous probabilities” are invalid. In the following, we give a
rigorous mathematical proof.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, where Ω is a sample space, F a collection (σ-algebra)
of subsets of Ω, and P the probability measure. We shall not consider any trivial cases, such
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as a probability space of a degenerate random variable. For a probability space of a random
variable, we assume that the random variable does not take on ±∞ as its value.
Definition 1 A P -collection is a nonempty family of sets in F , such that the sets are
pairwise disjoint, and each set has a positive probability less than one.
For a P -collection F , define
Φ(F ) = {γ : γ = P (A), A ∈ F}
and let G(F) be the set of all P -collections in F . Thus, ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is the union of all
Φ(F ), taking account of every P -collection in F .
Lemma 1 The set ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) includes all values in (0, 1) that the probability measure P
can take.
Proof: Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be a value of P . There exists A ∈ F with P (A) = γ. Two
complementary sets form a P -collection F = {A,Ac}, with Φ(F ) = {γ, 1 − γ}. Therefore,
γ ∈ ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ).

Lemma 2 A P -collection of a probability space (Ω,F , P ) is countable, i.e., there are count-
ably many (finite or countably infinite) different sets in a P -collection.
Proof: For a P -collection F of the probability space, we have
F =
∞⋃
n=1
Hn
where
Hn = {A ∈ F : 1/(n+ 1) < P (A) ≤ 1/n}, n = 1, 2, · · · .
If F is uncountable, i.e., if there are uncountably many different sets in F , then at least
one of H1, H2, · · · must be uncountable. Let Hm, where 1 ≤ m < ∞, be uncountable.
Select different sets in Hm, and denote the selected sets by Ai, i = 1, 2, · · · . Clearly, {Ai, i =
1, 2, · · · } is a family of pairwise disjoint sets. Since P (Ai) > 1/(m + 1) for all Ai, we have∑∞
i=1 P (Ai) =∞. But this is impossible. So F must be countable.

3
Theorem 1 For a probability space (Ω,F , P ), there are values almost everywhere in (0, 1)
that the probability measure P cannot take.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we need only show that ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is a nullset, i.e., a set of
(Lebesgue) measure zero. From Lemma 2, any P -collection F of the probability space is
countable. So any Φ(F ) is countable, and hence is a nullset. From the definition of a nullset,
Φ(F ) can be covered by a sequence of open intervals of arbitrarily small total length, i.e.,
Φ(F ) is a subset of the union of the covering intervals.
On the other hand, there is a countable base B for the topology induced by the usual
metric on the real line (restricted on the interval (0, 1)). Thus, for any Φ(F ), each covering
interval I of Φ(F ) is a union of some members of B. Since the length of I can be arbitrarily
small, the measure of any member of B contained in I can also be arbitrarily small.
Consequently, ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is a subset of a union of the members of B, such that each
member is contained in a covering interval of some Φ(F ), and has an arbitrarily small
measure. Since any member of B is a countable union of pairwise disjoint open intervals,
∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is covered by a sequence of open intervals of arbitrarily small total length.
Therefore, ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is a nullset.

We have also prepared two other versions of the proof of Theorem 1. Both versions are
essentially the same as the proof given above, but involve more intensive deliberation. Since
not every reader would consider the extra versions necessary, we put them in Appendix A.
A “continuous probability” is a “probability measure” whose range includes an interval.
We have an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 “Continuous probabilities” are invalid.
However, modern probability theory assumes “continuous probabilities” in two cases.
Case I. Consider a “continuous random variable”. By “continuous” in “continuous ran-
dom variable”, we mean “absolutely continuous”, i.e., the “random variable” has a “proba-
bility density function”, and the “probability measure” of the “random variable” can take
every value in a subinterval of (0, 1), as exemplified by those with uniform, exponential, and
normal distributions. The conclusion below is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 “Continuous random variables” do not exist.
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Although “continuous random variables” do not exist, there is a popular explanation of
“continuous probabilities” based on “continuous random variables”: A “continuous random
variable” is a result of approximating a sum of n discrete random variables as n tends to
infinity.
For example, consider n independent and identically distributed random variables, such
that the possible values of each random variable are 0 and 1. As claimed by the De Moivre-
Laplace limit theorem, for large n, a function, defined by an integral, can approximate
the distribution of the normalized sum of the random variables. The sum represents the
normalized number of successes in n Bernoulli trials.
Although the function given by the integral, known as the “standard normal distribution”,
is considered the limit of the distribution of the normalized sum, the approximation does
not result in the so-called “standard normal random variable”. For any given n, the set of
the possible values of the sum of the n random variables is {0, 1, 2, ..., n}. Consequently, the
normalized sum for any given n has n + 1 possible values. No matter how large n is, the
possible values of the normalized sum can only form a countable set. In other words, the
normalized sum is a discrete random variable for any n.
However, the “normal random variable” is a “continuous random variable” with an un-
countable set of values. The approximation is only in the sense that the value of the distri-
bution of the normalized sum and the value of the “normal distribution” can be close. But
such approximation does not necessarily imply the closeness between the normalized sum
and the “normal random variable” as two functions. The normalized sum has a countable
set as its range (set of possible values). But the range of the “normal random variable” is
an uncountable set.
Case II. The other way leading to “continuous probabilities” is due to denumerable se-
quences of elementary “events”. Such a sequence corresponds to a decimal expansion of a
real number in the unit interval. In general, the base of the expansion can be any given
integer q > 0. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we let q = 2. The following
result is also immediate from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . }. If F includes all subsets of Ω, and if P (ωn) = 2
−n for
all n ≥ 1, then (Ω,F , P ) is not a valid probability space.
“Continuous probabilities” are hypothetical, introduced into probability theory through
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various assumptions on sample spaces, σ-algebras, and “probability measures”, and will not
exist if the assumptions are abandoned as they should be, since we have shown that such
assumptions lead to contradictions and hence are incorrect. Actually, such assumptions are
just different ways to say that a “probability measure” can take every value in a subinterval
of (0, 1). Consequently, any “proof” of the existence of “continuous probabilities” (e.g., in
case II) is nothing but a tautology. In Appendix B, we show that all “counterexamples” to
Theorem 1 are based on such tautology, and clarify a confusion in some arguments of the
“counterexamples” caused by misunderstanding on measure theory.
Although “continuous probabilities” are invalid, a discrete probability can be induced by
a “continuous probability”. For example, consider a “probability density function” f with
domain D, which is an interval on the real line. Denote by E a partition of D, i.e., E is a
sequence of pairwise disjoint subintervals E1, E2, · · · , such that ∪Ei = D. By letting each Ei
in the partition represent an elementary event “x ∈ Ei” with probability P (Ei) =
∫
Ei
f(x)dx,
we then obtain a discrete probability.
However, once a partition E is given, for any subinterval H of an elementary event Ei
in E, we cannot calculate the probability of x ∈ H , since “x ∈ H” is neither an elementary
event, nor deducible from other elementary events. This leads to an uncertainty for the
induced probability itself, although any probability is a description of some uncertainty.
Such uncertainty in the induced probability is inevitable. This is because assigning a positive
probability value to every subinterval of D will lead to a “continuous probability”, which
is invalid. Nevertheless, with finer and finer partitions, we can decrease the uncertainty.
But since different partitions correspond to different probability spaces, the refinement will
require infinitely many probability distributions.
Discrete probability functions as induced above are actually used to calculate the values
of various probabilities and statistical quantities, not only in quantum mechanics, but also
in other applications of probability theory generally. This explains why probability theory
works well numerically, although “continuous probabilities” are invalid.
“Continuous probabilities” and the mathematical facts used in this paper to disprove
the existence of “continuous probabilities” are well-known, and can be found in standard
textbooks. For example, see [4, 5, 6]. Physicists may find [7] more accessible.
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III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The explanation of quantum phenomena and successful applications of quantum me-
chanics do not necessarily rely on the Copenhagen interpretation. For example, without
Born’s probability explanation, the solution of Schro¨dinger’s equation is sufficient to show
the existence of discrete energy levels.
Most physicists consider the result of the experimental test of Bell’s inequality evidence
supporting the Copenhagen interpretation. However, the derivation of Bell’s inequality
assumes “continuous probabilities” [3]. Since “continuous probabilities” are invalid, Bell’s
inequality itself is incorrect, and hence is not a valid basis for a test. So such result is not
supporting evidence for the Copenhagen interpretation. On the other hand, due to the flaw
in probability theory, the Copenhagen interpretation is incorrect, and hence is not eligible
for a meaningful test.
After pointing out the flaw of the Copenhagen interpretation, we find ourselves in a
situation described by Professor Sir Hermann Bondi [8]: Our work might be brushed aside
with comments like: “Quantum mechanics works. So there must be some fault in your
argument. Why waste time to sort it out when there are so many fascinating things to
be done?” However, Einstein would definitely disagree with such comments. Pursuing the
truth is not a waste of time in any sense. The Copenhagen interpretation actually closed
the door of exploring the reality behind quantum mechanics, though Einstein had tried to
keep the door open. With this paper, we want to reopen the door. We conclude by citing
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [2]:
“While we have thus shown that the wavefunction does not provide a complete description
of reality, we have left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We
believe, however, that such a theory is possible.”
APPENDIX A: MORE INVOLVED PROOFS
The following two proofs (Versions A and B) of Theorem 1 are essentially the same as
that we have originally given in Section II, but involve more intensive deliberation. For a set
S on the real line, µ(S) is the (Lebesgue) measure of S. If S is an interval, then µ(S) = |S|
is the length of S. To avoid misunderstanding or confusion, we first recall the definition of
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a set (on the real line) of (Lebesgue) measure zero.
Definition 2 A set Z is a set of measure zero, if for each ǫ > 0, there is a sequence of
(open) intervals {Im}, such that ∪Im ⊃ Z, and
∑
|Im| < ǫ.
For convenience of exposition, we refer to the “sequence” in Definition 2 (i.e., in “for each
ǫ > 0, there is a sequence ...”) as a “sequence of intervals of arbitrarily small total length.”
From Definition 2, the following is immediately evident.
Any fixed sequence of intervals is not a sequence of intervals of arbitrarily small total
length, since the total length of a fixed sequence of intervals cannot be less than each ǫ > 0.
Moreover, any fixed sequence of intervals covering a set Z is not relevant to whether Z is
of measure zero. For example, let Z be a set on the real line, and {Im} a fixed sequence
of intervals of total length l (i.e.,
∑
|Im| = l), such that ∪Im ⊃ Z. Although
∑
|Im| < ǫ
does not hold for each ǫ > 0, and although there are surely 0 < δ < l and Im ∈ {Im} with
|Im| ≥ δ, Z can still be a set of measure zero. Actually, we have the following alternative
definition.
Definition 3 A set Z is a set of measure zero, if for each 0 < ǫ < l, where l is arbitrarily
given, there is a sequence of (open) intervals {Im}, such that ∪Im ⊃ Z, and
∑
|Im| < ǫ.
Clearly, Definitions 2 and 3 are equivalent. Let l in Definition 3 be the total length of
a fixed sequence of intervals covering a set of measure zero. Since Definition 3 (and hence
Definition 2) does not involve the fixed sequence of intervals of total length l, and since l is
arbitrary, a set of measure zero is irrelevant to any fixed sequence of intervals.
Version A
Let Z be a set on the real line with µ(Z) = 0, and I(Z) the family of sequences of
intervals covering Z, i.e.,
I(Z) = {{Im} : ∪Im ⊃ Z, I1, I2, . . . are intervals}.
Lemma 3 For any decreasing sequence of positive real numbers {ǫm} (i.e., ǫm > ǫm+1 for
all m ≥ 1), there is a sequence {Im} ∈ I(Z), such that |Im| < ǫm for any Im ∈ {Im}.
Clearly, for any subinterval J of Im, |J | ≤ |Im| < ǫm.
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Proof: Assume that the lemma is false. There is then a decreasing sequence of positive
real numbers {ǫm}, such that any {Im} ∈ I(Z) contains some Im with |Im| ≥ ǫm, where
ǫm ∈ {ǫm}. Write
M = sup{m : |Im| ≥ ǫm, |Ij| < ǫj , j = 1, 2, . . . , m− 1, {Im} ∈ I(Z)}.
Since M = ∞ implies the existence of {Im} ∈ I(Z) with |Im| < ǫm for all m ≥ 1, we have
M <∞. Thus, for any {Im} ∈ I(Z),
∑
|Im| > ǫM > 0. As a result,
µ(Z) = inf
{∑
|Im| : {Im} ∈ I(Z)
}
≥ ǫM > 0.
We see a contradiction. Therefore, the lemma is true.

From Lemma 3, given P -collection F , for any decreasing sequence of positive real numbers
{ǫm}, we have {Im} ∈ I(Φ(F )) with |Im| < ǫm for any Im ∈ {Im}. Evidently, ǫm can be
arbitrarily small, i.e., ǫm can be less than any ǫ > 0, for all m ≥ 1 (e.g., we may let ǫ1 < ǫ).
On the other hand, Lemma 3 applies in particular if we require every {Im} ∈ I(Φ(F )) to be
a sequence of open intervals. In this case, for any {Im} ∈ I(Φ(F )), ∪Im equals a countable
union of members of the countable base B. Let Bi(F ) be the ith member in the union of the
members of B for the P -collection F , and N the set (or a finite subset) of positive integers.
Thus, for each P -collection F , we have Φ(F ) ⊂ ∪i∈NBi(F ), and
⋃
F∈G(F)
Φ(F ) ⊂
⋃
F∈G(F)
⋃
i∈N
Bi(F ). (A1)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, let each member of B be an open interval.
For example, B can be the family of open intervals in (0, 1) with rational endpoints. Since
B is a countable base, we can surely write
⋃
F∈G(F)
⋃
i∈N
Bi(F ) =
⋃
j∈N
Bj
where all Bj ∈ B.
As shown by Lemma 3, for any P -collection F , we can choose {Im} ∈ I(Φ(F )) with
|Im| < ǫm, where ǫm is sufficiently small for all m ≥ 1. Since for any j ≥ 1, Bj is a
subinterval of some Im ∈ {Im}, where {Im} ∈ I(Φ(F )) for some P -collection F , we have
|Bj| ≤ |Im| < ǫm. We can of course let ǫm in the above inequality be less than 2
−jτ for any
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τ > 0. Consequently, ⋃
F∈G(F)
Φ(F ) ⊂
⋃
j∈N
Bj
and ∑
j∈N
|Bj | <
∑
j∈N
2−jτ ≤ τ.
The last sum equals τ if N is the set of all positive integers. Thus, ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is a set of
measure zero.
Version B
We begin with (A1) established in Version A. But we no longer require Bi(F ) to be
intervals. For a P -collection F , write
C(F ) =
⋃
i∈N
Bi(F )
where Bi(F ) does not appear in C(F
′) for any P -collection F ′ 6= F . We list Bi(F ) only once
in ∪F∈G(F) ∪i∈N Bi(F ). As a result, any Bi(F ) appears only in one C(F ). Since there are
at most countably many Bi(F ) in ∪F∈G(F) ∪i∈N Bi(F ). there are at most countably many
C(F ). So we can use j = 1, 2, · · · to label different C(F ), i.e., for each C(F ), there is a
unique positive integer j, such that we can denote C(F ) by Cj. Consequently,
⋃
F∈G(F)
C(F ) =
⋃
j∈N
Cj
and ⋃
F∈G(F)
Φ(F ) ⊂
⋃
j∈N
Cj.
Clearly, each Cj either equals the union of a sequence of open intervals covering Φ(F )
for some P -collection F , or equals a subset of the union of the covering sequence. Since the
total length of the covering intervals can be less than any ǫ > 0, the measure of Cj, i.e.,
µ(Cj), can be less than any ǫ > 0.
Moreover, since Cj is a nonempty open set, we can express Cj as a countable union of
pairwise disjoint open intervals. Denote by Ij,k such intervals. So
Cj =
⋃
k∈N
Ij,k.
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Since µ(Cj) can be less than any ǫ > 0, |Ij,k| can be less than any ǫ > 0 for any Ij,k ⊆ Cj.
Thus, we can surely let
|Ij,k| < 2
−(j+k)τ
for any τ > 0 (see also Lemma 3). Therefore,
⋃
F∈G(F)
Φ(F ) ⊂
⋃
j∈N
⋃
k∈N
Ij,k
and ∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
|Ij,k| <
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
2−(j+k)τ ≤ τ.
The last sum equals τ if N is the set of all positive integers. So µ(∪F∈G(F)Φ(F )) = 0.
APPENDIX B: HYPOTHETICAL NATURE OF “CONTINUOUS PROBABILI-
TIES”
One might argue that, with Ω,F and P as given in Corollary 3, (Ω,F , P ) is not only
a valid probability space, but also a counterexample to Theorem 1. Based on the same
argument, one might even invent various “counterexamples” to Theorem 1. For instance,
one might consider the “probability space” of any “continuous random variable” such a
counterexample. However, the reasoning behind the above argument does not make any
sense, since it is a tautology. Any “continuous probability” is merely an assumption in the
disguise of a definition.
A probability measure P is a function, defined on F , a σ-algebra of subsets of a sample
space Ω. The set of all values of P is the range of P . Clearly, the range is part of the
definition of P .
Therefore, if one claims that the range of a “probability measure” includes an inter-
val, then this property of “continuous probabilities” is actually part of the definition of
the “probability measure”. Although one may verify this property against the definition,
the verification is not a proof of the validity of the “probability measure” itself, since the
“probability measure” is just so defined. Any mathematical reasoning, which begins with a
definition and ends merely with the definition, is nothing but a tautology.
Some arguments in the “counterexamples” also reflect misunderstanding on measure the-
ory. The following argument is representative. Denote by µ the Lebesgue measure. Let
11
I(a, b) represent an interval on the real line with endpoints a and b, where a < b. Let r be
an arbitrary number in I(a, b), and denote by {r} the set consisting of only one element r.
The values assigned to I(a, b) and {r} by the Lebesgue measure are respectively b − a and
0.
The basis of the argument is I(a, b) = ∪r∈I(a,b){r}. By letting a = 0 and b = 1, one might
use I(0, 1) = ∪r∈I(0,1){r}, together with µ(I(0, 1)) = 1 but m({r}) = 0 for any r ∈ I(0, 1),
to construct a “counterexample” to Theorem 1, and argue that µ(∪r∈I(0,1){r}) = 1 based
on I(0, 1) = ∪r∈I(0,1){r}. With such argument, one might consider that µ(I(0, 1)) is an
accumulation of µ({r}) for all r ∈ I(0, 1), i.e., µ(I(0, 1)) equals 1 by means of addition of
all µ({r}) rather than by definition. This is incorrect.
Consider, in general, a measure space (I(a, b),F , µ), where F is a σ-algebra, and µ is the
Lebesgue measure. In measure theory, countable additivity
µ(∪i∈NAi) =
∑
i∈N
µ(Ai)
with pairwise disjoint Ai ∈ F , i = 1, 2, · · · cannot be extended to uncountable additivity,
such as µ(∪r∈I(a,b){r}) =
∑
r∈I(a,b) µ({r}). By definition (e.g., see [6])
∑
r∈I(a,b)
µ({r}) = sup
{∑
r∈A
µ(r) : A ⊂ I(a, b), A is finite
}
= 0.
The calculated value of
∑
r∈I(a,b) µ({r}) contradicts the measure value assigned to the
interval I(a, b) according to the definition of Lebesgue measure. Thus, rather than being the
result of summation of uncountably many zeros, it is just so defined that µ(I(a, b)) = b− a.
Actually, for a measure space, countable union cannot be extended to uncountable union.
In particular, we have the following result.
Theorem 2 The expression I(a, b) = ∪r∈I(a,b){r} is invalid for Lebesgue measure.
Proof: Any set A with µ(A) > 0 has a non-measurable subset. For example, let
I(a, b) = [0, 1). A non-measurable subset of [0, 1) is given in [6]. If Theorem 2 is false,
then µ(∪r∈I(a,b){r}) = µ(I(a, b)) = b− a > 0. As a result, there is a non-measurable subset
V of ∪r∈I(a,b){r}. Define
W = ∪r∈I(a,b){r} \ V.
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If W = ∅, then I(a, b) = ∪r∈I(a,b){r} implies that I(a, b) is non-measurable. This is a
contradiction. So we assume W 6= ∅. By the well-ordering principle, there is a (strict) well
ordering ≺ for W [6]. Write
Wr = {x ∈ W : x ≺ r}, r ∈ W.
Let α be the first element of W . Define
E = {r ∈ W : {r} ∪Wr is measurable}.
Since {α}∪Wα = {α}∪∅ = {α}, and since {α} is measurable, α ∈ E. There are two cases.
(i) The set W has a last element β, and Wr has a last element η(r) for each r ∈ W . If
Wr ⊂ E, then for any x ∈ Wr, we have x ∈ E. As a result, {x} ∪Wx is measurable for any
x ∈ Wr. In particular, {η(r)} ∪Wη(r) is measurable. So
{r} ∪Wr = {r} ∪ ({η(r)} ∪Wη(r))
is measurable. Consequently, r ∈ E. By induction on W , we have W = E. Therefore,
β ∈ E, and hence
{β} ∪Wβ = W
is measurable. As a result
∪r∈I(a,b){r} \W = V
is measurable. We see a contradiction again.
(ii) The set W , or Wr for some r ∈ W , does not have a last element. Define Z = {z+ d :
z ∈ C}, where d is a constant, such that I(a, b) ∩ Z = ∅, and C is the Cantor set. Since
µ(C) = 0, and since Lebesgue measure is translation invariant [6], µ(Z) = µ(C) = 0.
If Wr does not have a last element for some r ∈ W , then we take an element of Z that
has not been taken for any Ws, s 6= r. Denote this element of Z also by η(r), and the set
of all such η(r) by H. Since H ⊂ Z, we have µ(H) = 0. If Wr has a last element for each
r ∈ W , then H = ∅.
We extend the order ≺ by setting η(r) ≺ r and x ≺ η(r) for all x ∈ Wr. If Ws and Wr
do not have last elements, where s ≺ r, then with such extension, we have (a) η(s) ≺ η(r),
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(b) for any x ∈ Wr, if x ≺ s, then x ≺ η(s); otherwise η(s) ≺ x, and (c) x ≺ η(r) for
any x ∈ Ws. Define Ur = {η(r)} ∪Wr ∪ {η(s) ∈ H : s ≺ r}. For Wr with a last element,
Ur =Wr ∪ {η(s) ∈ H : s ≺ r}.
IfW does not have a last element, then we take an element not in ∪r∈I(a,b){r}∪H, denote
this element also by β, and define U = {β} ∪W ∪ H. We further extend the order ≺ by
setting r ≺ β for all r ∈ W ∪ H. If W already has a last element β, then β ∈ W , and
U = W ∪ H. It is easy to verify that U is well ordered by the extended order ≺, and has
the same first element as that of W .
Now U has a last element β, and Ur has a last element for each r ∈ U , which is either the
last element of Wr, or η(r) ∈ H. We use U and Ur to replace W and Wr, respectively, and
consider measure space (I(a, b) ∪ H ∪ {β},F ∪ F(H, β), µ) instead of (I(a, b),F , µ), where
F(H, β) is the family of all subsets of H ∪ {β}. With the same argument for case (i),
{β} ∪ Uβ = U =

 {β} ∪W ∪H, β 6∈ WW ∪H, β ∈ W
is measurable. Consequently,
W =

 U \ ({β} ∪ H), β 6∈ WU \ H, β ∈ W
is measurable. This again leads to the contradiction in case (i).

We can also obtain the above result based on a simple observation. One of the most im-
portant notions in measure theory is that of neglecting sets of measure zero. After neglecting
sets of measure zero from the measure space, it can be seen clearly that I(a, b) = ∪r∈I(a,b){r}
is invalid.
A probability measure is also a measure. The elucidation above shows clearly why a
probability measure must be defined on a σ-algebra F for an uncountable sample space like
I(a, b). In other words, for such a sample space Ω = I(a, b), we must assign probabilities to
subsets of Ω.
For measure spaces like (I(a, b),F , µ), a necessary condition is that F cannot include all
subsets of I(a, b). This is because some subsets are not measurable in the sense of Lebesgue
measure. So the definition of F imposes some restrictions on the members of F . Yet
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Theorem 1 shows that such restrictions are not restrictive enough to make (I(a, b),F , P ),
where P = µ/(b − a), a valid probability space. A more stringent restriction that the
range of the probability measure must be a set of Lebesgue measure zero should be imposed
on any probability space. With this restriction, the σ-algebra F of the probability space
(I(a, b),F , P ) cannot include all subintervals of I(a, b).
APPENDIX C: RESPONSE TO COMMENT (QUANT-PH/0509130)
This appendix is a point-by-point response to a comment (quant-ph/0509130) on our
paper (quant-ph/0509089). We find the comment incorrect.
1. Points Raised in quant-ph/0509130
Point 1: The comment (quant-ph/0509130) claims a “counterexample” (Ω,F , P ), where
Ω = [0, 1],F = Borel sets in [0, 1], and P is the Lebesgue measure (referred to as Lebesgue-
Borel measure in quant-ph/0509130) restricted to the σ-algebra F of the Borel sets. With
this “counterexample”, it is claimed, in quant-ph/0509130, that P (F) (the range of P ) is
[0, 1].
Point 2: Let S = ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) (the right side is generally defined in our paper
quant-ph/0509089). It is claimed, in quant-ph/0509130, that S is not necessarily a member
of the σ-algebra F .
Point 3: From P (Φ(F )) = 0 for any F ∈ G(F), one cannot conclude P (S) =∑
F∈G(F) P (Φ(F )) = 0.
2. Our Response
Response to Point 1: The “counterexample” is a meaningless tautology. We have inten-
sively deliberated on this issue in our paper. Please see Appendix B in quant-ph/0509089.
Any “continuous probability”, like P given in the “counterexample”, is merely an as-
sumption in the disguise of a definition. The range of P is part of the definition of P . Such
definition causes contradictions, as we have proved in quant-ph/0509089 that the range of a
probability measure cannot include any interval. The definition of P in the “counterexam-
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ple” also makes the comment in quant-ph/0509130 self-contradictory.
To see the self-contradiction, here is an example. If P is a probability measure, then any
element of S is a value of P in (0, 1). Denote by R the range of P after removing 0 and
1. So R is a subset of S, and S ⊂ (0, 1). On the other hand, if the range of P is [0, 1] as
claimed in quant-ph/0509130 (Point 1), then R = (0, 1) and S = (0, 1). Clearly, the open
unit interval (0, 1) is a member of the σ-algebra F of the Borel sets in [0, 1]. This contradicts
the claim in Point 2 that S is not necessarily a member of F .
Response to Point 2: We have proved that, for a probability measure, ∪F∈G(F)Φ(F ) is a
set of Lebesgue measure zero in quant-ph/0509089. Since Lebesgue measure restricted to
the σ-algebra of Borel sets is not complete, a set of Lebesgue measure zero is not necessarily
a member of the σ-algebra.
Response to Point 3: Point 3 is misleading, since our proof of the invalidity of “continuous
probabilities” in quant-ph/0509089 is based on a concept in topology called countable base,
and does not involve P (S) =
∑
F∈G(F) P (Φ(F )) = 0. We give a concise version of the proof
in the main text, and two additional versions with more intensive deliberations in Appendix
A. Point 3 is irrelevant to any of the three versions of our proof.
3. Conclusion
We have responded, point-by-point, to the comment in quant-ph/0509130 on our paper
quant-ph/0509089. We conclude that the comment is incorrect.
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